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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have long argued over the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause and the basic question it now poses: To what extent should society
accommodate religious exercise by making exceptions to generally applicable
governmental laws for religiously motivated behavior? Rare is it to find an
absolutist on these issues. Few believe that religious exemptions are always
appropriate; few believe that they are always inappropriate! The difficult tasks
have been in drawing the line between appropriate religious exemptions and
inappropriate ones, figuring out what types of doctrinal arrangements can best
approximate that line, and deciding which levels and branches of government
are justly charged with deciding these issues.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law. I would like to
thank Gregory Bowman, Kenry Kornblatt, Michael McCann, Cassandra Burke Robertson, and
Nelson Tebbe for helpful comments on this piece. Thanks also must go to Rachel Reed for her
valuable research assistance.
1. See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. Rnv. 1169, 1169 (2007)
("Hardly anyone thinks that human sacrifice should be exempt from the murder laws. And
hardly anyone thinks that government should compel Catholics to ordain female priests, or
forbid children to take a sip of communion wine.").
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Over the past fifteen years, Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence
Sager have built up a comprehensive theory that addresses these questions-a
theory they call Equal Liberty.2 Equal Liberty is not just a theory of religious
exemptions; it addresses the full range of Religion Clause topics. But Equal
Liberty has special importance for those concerned with the Free Exercise
Clause. Eisgruber and Sager represent the best of a new wave of theorists who
attack religious exemptions. They do so principally neither on grounds of
federalism or judicial restraint, nor on grounds of manageability or originalism.
Rather, they attack religious exemptions on the general premise that they are
fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the importance of Eisgruber and Sager's
work is how the finest scholars in the field have felt it necessary to react to
Equal Liberty, devoting whole articles to their responses.3 For the most part,
this piece will try to avoid duplicating the points made in those pieces, because
my focus is slightly different. I want to raise issues primarily regarding
doctrine. Increasingly important today are questions about how constitutional
meaning and constitutional doctrine intersect.4 Indeed, Lawrence Sager
authored one of the pioneering works in the field thirty years ago.5 This review
2. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CoNsTITuTIoN (2007); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal
Regard, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRIcAL ANTHOLOGY 200 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard]; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basisfor Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REv. 1245 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability ofConscience];
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV.
577 (1996) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom]; Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act].
3. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000); Thomas Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 85
TEx. L. REV. 1185 (2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrruTION (2007)); Kent Greenawalt, How Does "Equal
Liberty"Fare in Relation to Other Approaches to the Religion Clauses?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1217
(2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTrrUTION (2007)); Abner S. Greene, Three Theories ofReligious Equality. . .Andof
Exemptions, 87 TEX. L. REV. 963 (2009) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrTUION (2007)); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, The Limits ofEqual Liberty as a Theory ofReligious Freedom, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1247
(2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCEG. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CoNSTTmON (2007)).
4. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1
(2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARv. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the
Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REv. 1649 (2005).
5. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
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raises questions about whether Equal Liberty can really be translated into a
usable set of doctrinal principles; it suggests that Equal Liberty, at bottom, is
unworkable. And from that initial point, it goes on to explore how, when it
comes to Free Exercise, it is largely doctrine that divides us. We agree, for the
most part, on how cases should be decided; we mostly agree on what the ideal
state of religious liberty looks like. Our most intense disagreements, however,
are about the doctrine we need to get us there. This review looks at those
disagreements, to discover their roots, explore their significance, and examine
their possible resolutions.
1. EQUAL LIBERTY AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
A. An Introduction to Free Exercise
For years, the Free Exercise Clause has been largely synonymous with the
question of when religious believers should be exempt from their general legal
obligations. Modem government regulates society extensively. It structures
much of our individual lives, including what we can eat or drink, what jobs we
can take, and what we learn in school. Government also structures our lives as
they are lived in relation to others, limiting who we can employ, where we can
meet, and what we can do together. Consequently, unless exceptions are made,
all this has the potential to make religious life difficult or impossible.6
While absolutist approaches seem almost de rigueur for the Establishment
Clause, this is not so for the Free Exercise Clause. Arguments about religious
exemptions have always been particularly fact-sensitive. Virtually everyone
acknowledges that religious exemptions are sometimes appropriate.7 And
virtually everyone recognizes that there are some religious exemptions that
must be denied . The enduring question has been how to distinguish between
proper exemptions and improper ones, which in turn has spawned other related
questions-questions about whether there are principled methods of drawing
such lines and questions about which of the levels and branches of government
have the competence and authority to do it.
Predictably, scholars are all over the map on these issues. But they do tend
to divide into two general schools of thought. Some adopt a nondiscrimination
approach-they argue that, in determining how the government should treat
religious groups and individuals, the dispositive question should be how it
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
6. For similar elaborations of this basic problem, see Berg, supra note 3, at 1190-9 1, and
Laycock, supra note 1, at 1169.
7. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (granting, unanimously, a religious exemption for the use of hoasca in religious
ceremonies).
8. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down, with
only a single dissenting justice, a religious exemption which gave employees an absolute right
not to work on their chosen Sabbath).
3
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treats nonreligious groups and individuals. If the religious are not being
discriminated against within some meaning of that word, then the claim for
exemption should fail.9 Others adopt a substantive approach-they argue that
discrimination is not the only concern. Instead, religious groups should be
given rights to practice their religion even in the absence of any discrimination
and even if this means that they are uniquely exempt from a particular law.'0
Nondiscrimination approaches tend to emphasize equality while substantive
approaches tend to emphasize liberty. But both types of approaches concern
themselves with both values." The Supreme Court used to adopt a substantive
approach. 12 However, in 1990, the Court switched to a nondiscrimination
approach in Employment Division v. Smith.'13 Under Smith's rule, as long as the
law in question is neutral and generally applicable, no exemptions are
possible. Smith's nondiscrimination rule was less protective of religious
exercise than the substantive test it replaced.'15 But this does not necessarily
9. For a classic exposition of a nondiscrimination approach, see Philip B. Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. Rcv. 1 (196 1).
10. For a classic exposition of the substantive approach, see Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 993 (1990).
Laycock uses the related term "substantive neutrality" for his vision of the Religion Clauses,
whereby the government aims to "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance."
Id. at 100 1. Others adopt similar formulations. See. e.g., Thomas C. Berg. Religion Clause Anti-
Theories, 72 NoTmE DAMvE L. REv. 693, 703-04 (1997) (arguing that government should
"minimize the effect it has on the voluntary, independent religious decisions of the people as
individuals and in voluntary groups"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1146-47 (1990) (adopting a sort of "incentive
neutrality," whereby "free exercise exemptions [are given] to ensure that incentives to practice a
religion are not adversely affected by government action"). I will use the term "substantive
neutrality" in this article as a way of referring to these theories collectively; any slight
differences between these formulations are not relevant here. Of course, I do not mean to
suggest that any of the above commentators agree with any of the arguments I make below.
11. Even within each approach, scholars dispute the relative priority of these two values.
See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699
(2005) (arguing that substantive approaches to Free Exercise should emphasize liberty as a
distinct constitutional value more than they usually do).
12. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 409 (1963) (holding that the
government must have a compelling state interest before it could burden religious practice);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (same).
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
14. Smith's meaning was fleshed out more in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). But there is still much uncertainty about the type of
nondiscrimination right that Smith and Lukumi establish. For more on this point, see
Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement
in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 636-644 (2003).
15. Few doubt that Smith was less protective than Sherbert, although the difference
between the two may be smaller than is commonly thought. See, e.g., EISGRLJBER & SAGER,
supra note 2, at 257 ("[Sherbert's] compelling state interest test had always talked tough but
354 [Vol. 77:351
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prove that nondiscrimination theories are always weaker than substantive ones.
In some circumstances, a strong nondiscrimination right might very well
provide more protection to religious observers than a weak substantive right.
For example, Justice O'Connor adopted a substantive view of Free Exercise,
but rejected the plaintiffs' claim in Smith; Eisgruber and Sager adopt a
nondiscrimination view, but seem more responsive to such a claim.'16
B. An Introduction to Equal Liberty
Equal Liberty is Eisgruber and Sager's theory of religious freedom.'17 It is,
at bottom, a theory of nondiscrimination. At its core, Equal Liberty is
concerned with equality. "[I]n the name of equality," Eisgruber and Sager
argue, "[no one] ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual foundations of
their important commitments and projects."'18 Instead there should be "a broad
understanding of constitutional liberties generally[,]" which includes "rights of
free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private property that,
while neither uniquely relevant to reli~ion nor defined in terms of religion, will
allow religious practice to flourish."'
In the context of religious exemptions, Equal Liberty draws a fundamental
distinction between claims of protection and claims of privilege .2 0 Religious
people are entitled to "equal regard," which means that they must be protected
from things like "discrimination, hostility and neglect[ .],, 2 If the state fails to
treat their deep interests with the same consideration that other groups receive,
there is a problem. This devaluing is called "a failure of equal regard," which
Eisgruber and Sager describe as "a failure by the state to show the same
performed feebly."). For an example of a nondiscrimination right significantly narrower than
Smith, see Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacriice and
Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1 (1996) (adopting a nondiscrimination theory of sorts,
although concluding that the Supreme Court's unanimous finding of discrimination in Lukumi
was without warrant).
16. Compare Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,891-907 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment), with EiSGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 92-93, 95-96.
17. In addition to their academidc works on the subject (which are cited in supra note 2),
Eisgruber and Sager have also worked as consultants on these issues, see EISGRUBER & SAGER,
supra note 2, at 9, and have testified before Congress on religious exemptions, see Testimony
Submitted to the H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on the Constitution, Regarding H.R. 1691,
106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of Lawrence G. Sager & Christopher L. Eisgruber). Eisgruber
and Sager have also filed briefs in litigated cases, see Brief of Christopher L. Eisgruber and
Lawrence G. Sager as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Michael A. Newdow, Elk Grove
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), 2004 WL 314155.
18. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 52.
19. Id at 52-53.
20. They drew this distinction initially in Eisgruber & Sager. The Vulnerability of
Conscience, supra note 2, at 1250 (discussing, at length, the "two modalities of constitutional
justice: privilege and protection").
2 1. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 112.
2010] 5
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concern for the fundamental needs of all its citizens."22 This devaluing can have
a range of causes-it may be caused by "hate, habit, a misguided impulse to
lead others to the true way, or an indifference born of a lack of empathy." 23 At
bottom, this devaluing is exactly what Equal Liberty seeks to prevent. And
when it occurs, religious claims for exemption are required simply in order for
all citizens to be treated equally under the law.
Yet what makes Eisgruber and Sager's theory both unique and
controversial, however, is its assertion that nonreligious people are also entitled
to equal liberty. Protecting the equal liberty of nonreligious people means
putting limits on claims for religious exemption. This is Equal Liberty's core
claim-in the absence of things like hostility, neglect, or indifference, religious
exemptions are constitutionally inappropriate because they essentially amount
to favoritism for religious groups and individuals. Here Equal Liberty
frequently returns to a hypothetical example involving two soup kitchens: one
religious and one secular.2 Both soup kitchens are motivated by a desire to
help the poor and both have difficulty with their local government, which
denies them both operating permits. Say the religious group is given an
operating permit for some reason relating back to its religiosity, while the
nonreligious group is denied one. Isn't this, Eisgruber and Sager ask, a
straightforward case of religious discrimination actually and justly prohibited
by the Constitution? Of course, the potential unfairness of religious exemptions
to nonreligious people has been raised before quite thoughtfully, both in law
reviews2 and the United States Reports .26 But with more space and with
22. Id.
23. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1284.
24. EiSGRUBER& SAGER, supra note 2, at 11-13,54-55.
25. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLERocKL. REv. 555 (1998); Steven G.
Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75 (1990); William Marshall, In
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 5 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 308 (199 1); Suzanna
Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. Rnv. 123.
26. Justice Stevens voiced this concern in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
where he argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act violated the Establishment Clause
by preferring religious people to nonreligious ones. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Act "has provided the [plaintiff] with a legal weapon that no atheist or
agnostic can obtain"). Justice Stevens had articulated this sort of disquiet about religious
exemptions earlier, in fact. In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), an Amish plaintiff
sought an exemption from social security taxes. Id. at 254. Stevens noted that an exemption
would be unfair to nonreligious people, as it would pressure them into becoming religious. Id. at
263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A tax exemption entails no cost to the claimant; if tax
exemptions were dispensed on religious grounds, every citizen would have an economic
motivation to join the favored sects."). Laying out the standard the Court ultimately adopted in
Smith, Stevens explained that he did not see exemptions as appropriate when the law in question
was a "valid and neutral law of general applicability." Id.
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complete devotion to this topic, Eisgruber and Sager provide a more nuanced
and thorough account of this unfairness.
C Equal Liberty and General Applicability
Perhaps the easiest way to understand Equal Liberty is by comparing it to
the current governing standard for religious exemptions: the Smith rule. In
Employment Division v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not entitle religious observers to be exempt from laws that are
neutral and generally applicable. Only when a law fails to meet those standards
does a religious claim for exemption become possible. Thus, in practice,
religious observers can only challenge laws that invidiously discriminate
against them (neutrality) or that make exceptions for other groups but not for
them (general applicability).
Eisgruber and Sager make clear that Equal Liberty is at least as protective
as the Smith test. Here, Equal Liberty emphasizes the importance of general
applicability. If a law makes an exception for some deep secular need,
Eisgruber and Sager stress, then religious exemption to that law should follow
as a matter of course .28 Thus, a Jewish schoolchild playing basketball in a
public-school league should be given an exemption to wear a yarmulke when
the leagues though barring headgear generally, makes exceptions for
eyeglasses.i9 Similarly, Eisgruber and Sager agree with a leading Third Circuit
case that gave Muslim police officers the right to wear a beard in pursuit of
their religious commitments, despite a general rule requiring officers to be
clean shaven, because the police department had let other officers go unshaven
for medical reasons .30 These outcomes cohere effortlessly with Equal Liberty's
focus on devaluation. To the extent a law is not generally applicable, it has
indeed privileged some secular need over the religious need at question.
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 90 ("Failures of equal regard are especially easy
to recognize when the state has accommodated serious mainstream religious or secular interests
but refuses to provide an equivalent accommodation for the comparably serious interests of
minority religious groups or individuals.").
29. Id. at 90-92 (discussing Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir.
1982)).
30. Id. (discussing Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. Newark, 170 F.3d
359 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J., for the panel)). Newark is a crucial case in the discussion of the
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause. See Lund, supra note 14, at 645-69 (discussing it and the
commentary surrounding it); see also Metric J. Polloway, Note, Free Exercise Forbids Police
Departments to Discipline Officers Who Wear Beards for Religious Reasons When Other
Secular Reasonsfor Wearing Beards Already Merit Exemptive Statuis, 30 SETON HALL L. REv.
397 (1999).
7
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D. Equal Liberty Beyond General Applicability
The interesting question is to what extent Equal Liberty gives more
protection to religious exercise than general applicability. Eisgruber and Sager
make clear that their theory is intended to go beyond general applicability. The
lack of a clear secular exception does not kill a claim for religious exemption in
their eyes; Equal Liberty allows claims for exemption even where there is an
"absence of an obvious benchmark" with which to gauge whether there has
been a failure of equal regard .3 1 To illustrate this point, Eisgruber and Sager
turn back to Employment Division v. Smith, 2 where members of the Native
American Church were denied unemployment compensation benefits because
of their religious use of peyote.3 Finding that the Oregon statute forbidding
peyote use was neutral and h enerally applicable, the Supreme Court denied
them a religious exemption.
Eisgruber and Sager are not willing to so quickly dismiss claims like that of
the Native American Church in Smith. They would have had the Court look
farther afield-to the fact that Oregon apparently exempts Christian children
taking wine at communion from the laws forbidding the distribution of alcohol
to minors .3 5 The existence of that exception to the under-age laws, Eisgruber
and Sager conclude, is significant evidence that the Native American Church's
religious interests had been devalued. Ultimately though, they are unwilling to
say that Smith was therefore wrongly decided, because peyote might actually
well be ob)jectively more dangerous than wine and thus deserving of unequal
treatment.
But Equal Liberty is even stronger than this mutant version of general
applicability. As Eisgruber and Sager explain, Equal Liberty is a source of
exemptions even in situations where there are no benchmarks at all.3 Even in
the pure case of a completely uniform statute, exemptions are sometimes
appropriate. Here Eisgruber and Sager introduce the most important element of
their conceptual apparatus: the "implicit counterfactual question." 38
While general applicability looks to whether a significant group has
actually been exempted from the law at issue, the counterfactual looks to
whether a significant group would have been exempted from that law had they
31. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 92.
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 88 1-90.
35. The wine/peyote analogy was noticed even before the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith. See Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHIusTiAN CENTuRY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 882, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
36. EiSGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 93 ("People might reasonably disagree about
that question.").
37. Id. at 91 ("[T]he requirements of Equal Liberty apply even in the absence of ready-
made comparisons.").
3 8. Id. at 92.
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asked for it. In Eisgruber and Sager's terms, the question courts must ask is
whether the government would have accommodated "serious mainstream
religious or secular interests but [nevertheless] refuses to provide an equivalent
accommodation for the comparably serious interests of minority religious
groups or individuals."39 Thus, for example, with regard to Smith, Eisgruber
and Sager ask the following: "[I]f strong secular needs (medical uses, for
example) or mainstream religious needs had required exception to the peyote
ban, would Oregon have made such exceptions?"40
This counterfactual inquiry is a gamechanger. It is what makes Equal
Liberty resoundingly different from general applicability and what turns
Eisgruber and Sager's conception of Free Exercise into an extraordinarily
attractive nondiscrimination theory. One real problem with general applicabili'
has been its failure to provide any protection in the case of uniform statutes.
Small religious minorities often want idiosyncratic things-they demand rights
that no one else wants. As a result of their nonmainstream beliefs, they are
often burdened by laws that burden no one else.4 Because no significantly
sized group is burdened, no exceptions to the law ever develop. For this reason,
the statutes burdening small religious minorities are disproportionately likely to
be uniform ones, immune to challenge under the Smith rule.4 No conception of
general applicability, however expansive, can provide protection in those
39. Id at 90. The discussion in their recent book is quite similar to that of an earlier piece.
See Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1289-90.
40. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1289.
41. See Lund, supra note 14, at 659 ("[Sltatutes that serve weak governmental interests
will often be uniform. This effectively insulates them from judicial review insofar as the Free
Exercise Clause is concerned[.]").
42. See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (seeking the right to use peyote in Native American religious ceremonies); Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (seeking the right to prevent
development of government land that has religious value to certain Native Americans); Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (seeking the right to get federal AFDC and Food Stamp aid
without having to use a social security number); Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)
(seeking to obtain a driver's license from the state of Nebraska without a photograph).
43. Many minority groups, for example, object to autopsies as interfering with their
religious practices or even threatening the existence of their souls after death. But state autopsy
statutes can be uniform, because few people these days care greatly about the physical integrity
of their bodies after death. Thus, states sometimes mandate autopsies in cases of violent death,
even when the cause of death is obvious, no matter the cost to the religious individual or
community. The only obvious analogy is cremation, in the sense that many Christians used to
object to being cremated after death (although fewer do now), and states do not generally have
laws requiring cremation. But that analogy is too loose to expect courts to embrace it as a reason
to give exemptions in autopsy cases under the doctrine of general applicability. The autopsy
cases are addressed generally in Lund, supra note 14, at 657-660 & nn. 99-109, and the
analogy to cremation is discussed in Christopher C. Lund, Autopsies and Free Exercise Beliefs,
in ENCYCLOPEDI OF AmERicAN CiviL LIBERTIES (Paul Finkelrnan ed., 4 vols., Routledge, 2006).
20101 59
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circumstances."4 But with the aid of this counterfactual. inquiry, Equal Liberty
reaches out to those cases and offers the possibility of relief even in
circumstances that would be hopeless under Smith.
The genius of general applicability, if there is one, is that religious
minorities can rely on the political advocacy of larger, more mainstream groups.
When those larger groups get exceptions made for them during the political
process, religious claimants can claim derivative exemptions through the
judiciary by means of the Free Exercise Clause .45 The genius of Equal Liberty
is that religious groups now need not depend on the political process at all.
They need not rely on their own advocacy to win exemptions. They need not
rely on larger groups to win exceptions that they can use. They can directly
petition the judiciary themselves for an exemption. Through the counterfactual,
small religious groups have truly equal liberty, regardless of their size or
conviction. In this way, Equal Liberty becomes general applicability with a
vengeance.
E. Some Preliminary Difficulties with Equal Liberty
Equal Liberty faces a number of preliminary challenges, some of which
have been raised before and addressed by other commentators. One of them
deserves attention at this juncture, because it will matter later. Equal Liberty
faces what I call the "multiple secular baseline" problem. In any given religious
exemption case, there can be multiple secular baselines-that is, secular groups
treated in a variety of ways. This creates a problem for equality models of Free
Exercise, which entitle religious groups and individuals to the protections
received by secular groups and individuals. This sort of equality model works
easily when secular groups are all treated the same way. When all secular
groups are exempt from a law, an objecting religious group must be exempt as
well. That seems easy enough. But a problem arises when secular groups are
treated differently from each other. That is when complications ensue. For then
we have to make an initial decision about the point of comparison. Does
equality demand that the religious groups be treated as well as the most favored
secular group or the least favored secular group? Take again the police
department that exempts officers with medical conditions from the rule that
they be clean-shaven. Even though the rule has a medical exception, most
officers will still have to comply with it. They will still have to shave. The rule
makes no exceptions for those who might understandably prefer not to do so-
those who have physical scars on their face that they are ashamed of and want
to hide, those who are unattractive clean-shaven, and those whose children love
their beards. Everything hinges on the point of comparison. If the Muslim
44. See Lund, supra note 14, at 659-661.
45. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 50.
46. These again are the facts of Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v.
Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
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officers are treated like those with medical conditions, they will be given a right
to wear beards. But if we select any other comparison group, they will not.
This has always been the central mystery of the Smith rule: How many
secular exceptions do there need to be before a religious claim under the Free
Exercise Clause becomes possible? Commentators struggle with it.47 Courts do
as well .48 And every time a court struggles with the issue of comparison--every
time a court has to decide whether a rule's exceptions are enough to render it
not generally applicable for purposes of Free Exercise-it is confronting this
"6multiple secular baseline" problem.
But Equal Liberty faces more difficulty in this regard than general
applicability, because of its insistence that equality go both ways. Equal Liberty
will not permit religious groups to be ignored when secular ones are
accommodated (because that is discrimination). But it also will not permit
religious groups to be accommodated when secular groups are not (because that
too is discrimination) .4 9 This creates a problem. This dual-equality model can
only be coherently applied when all secular groups are treated the same way.
When the law treats secular groups in different ways-as it often does-Equal
Liberty simply breaks down. For when the law exempts one secular group and
does not exempt another, there is simply no way to treat a religious claimant
identically to both. For example, if a prison accommodates vegetarians but
refuses to accommodate vegans, the prison is absolutely stuck when an
Orthodox Jew seeks a Kosher meal. Denying the Kosher meal means that the
Orthodox Jew is treated worse than the vegetarian. But granting the Kosher
meal means that he is treated better than the vegan. Equal Liberty will have to
choose whether the religious claimant wins or not, but the cost of either
decision is the same-someone's interests will be devalued on account of their
religion.
11. EQUAL LIBERTY AND THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY
Let us return to Eisgruber and Sager's counterfactual inquiry. This concept
is the heart of Equal Liberty. It is what ensures that religious groups receive
truly equal liberty. For religious minorities in particular, Equal Liberty's
47. See Lund, supra note 14, at 641 n.59 (citing pieces that debate the point, including
Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the
General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (200 1); Kenneth D. Sansom,
Note, Sharing the Burden. Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in
Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 77 TEx. L. REv. 750 (1999); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 MD. L.J. 77, 114 (2000)).
48. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359
(3d Cir. 1999); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
49. Eisgruber & Sager, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 2, at 457
("Government betrays the ideal of equal regard [both] when it treats religious interests less
favorably than secular ones ... and when it treats religious interests more favorably than secular
ones.").
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promise rests entirely on the proper functioning of the counteffactual. 50 But
unfortunately, it seems that the counterfactual is not a workable solution for
Free Exercise. It seems to be largely indeterminate, and it is not clear how that
problem can be fixed. Thus, at the end of the day, Equal Liberty seems to
devolve back into the same general applicability inquiry it seeks to replace.
Recall again how the counterfactual operates. It seeks to determine whether
there has been a failure of equal regard by looking at whether such burdens
would have been placed on serious secular or mainstream groups.5 ' So, with
regard to Smith, for example, Eisgruber and Sager ask: "[I1f strong secular
needs (medical uses, for example) or mainstream religious needs had required
exception to the peyote ban, would Oregon have made such exceptions?" 52
We can get a sense of the indeterminacy problem by considering whether
religious polygamists should have a claim, under the Free Exercise Clause, to a
religious exemption from the statutes forbidding plural marriage h urm
Court rejected such a claim in Reynolds v. United States.5 For decades, it has
served as a strawman against stronger theories of religious exemption. 54 All this
is to say that Eisgruber and Sager would probably dismiss out of hand any
suggestion that Equal Liberty requires an exemption here.
But that seems called for by a straightforward application of their
counterfactual. Under it, we start with a society where a polygamous group
could be considered serious and mainstream. That is quite hard to imagine-
consider how different America would look if polygamous Mormons were
50. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (explaining that religious minorities
face uniform statutes, which are immune to challenge under Smith but that can potentially be
challenged under Equal Liberty's counterfactual).
51. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 90 (looking to whether the government would
accommodate "serious mainstream religious or secular interests," but nevertheless still "refutses
to provide an equivalent accommodation for the comparably serious interests of minority
religious groups or individuals").
52. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1289.
53. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
54. During oral argument at the Supreme Court, for example, advocates for religious
exemptions have been routinely pressured into disavowing the claims of bigamists or
polygamists. See Oral Argument in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unilo do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), available at 2005 WLT 3046682, at 47 (asking plaintiff's counsel
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act gives protection to bigamists or polygamists);
Oral Argument in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), available at 1997 WL 87109,
at 35-36 (same); Oral Argument in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993), available at 1992 WL 687913, at 14 (asking plaintiff's counsel whether
his view of the Free Exercise Clause is inconsistent with polygamy prosecutions); Oral
Argument in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1 980-1989/1989/1989_88_121 3/argument].
Now that polygamous groups are beginning to seek public approval, there seemis to be
renewed interest in the particular issue raised by Reynolds. For more, see Jeffrey Michael Hayes,
Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New Strategy of Polygamy Activists, 3 STAN. J. Crv.
RT's. & Civ. Lm~s. 99 (2007).
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thought of as just part and parcel of the Christian mainstream. But yet in that
society, admittedly somewhat far from our own, it seems obvious that the
religious polygamist would not be sent to jail. The state would either not
criminalize polygamy at all, or it would make exceptions to its polygamy laws
for the mainstream group.
Consider an even wilder claim. Consider the claim of a religious person
who wishes to engage in a religious act of involuntary human sacrifice. This, of
course, is the paradigmatic example of a claim that must be denied. This
example too usually appears as a strawman argument against religious
exemptions."5 But Equal Liberty's counterfactual takes this claim seriously. Its
conclusion seems to be the unbelievable one: If we indeed lived in a society
where a secular or religious group could practice involuntary human sacrifice
and still remain a "mainstream" and "serious" group, then it could well be the
case that the group would receive an exemption from the homicide laws.
Put in more conceptual terms, a fundamental problem for Equal Liberty lies
in how it hitches the rights of minority groups onto the rights of mainstream
groups. Mainstream groups tend, by mere definition, to be the ones that
legislatures accommodate. Th very fact that a society is willing to criminalize
the religious activities of a group is part of what proves that the group is not
mainstream. Thus, Equal Liberty's counterfactual feeds back on itself. It
becomes true by tautology, by a form of circular reasoning. Applied sincerely,
Equal Liberty's counterfactual makes it far more protective of minority groups
than any other theory of religious liberty on the market-more protective, for
example, than the compelling-interest test which Eisgruber and Sager
themselves criticize as protecting religious liberty too much. 57
In a piece written more than fifteen years ago, Professor Michael
McConnell suggested a theo7? in some ways similar to Equal Liberty, which
had a similar counterfactual.' McConnell explained his test as mandating that
"the claims of minority religions should receive the same consideration under
the Free Exercise Clause that the claims of mainstream religions receive in the
55. This strawman featured prominently in two cases arising out of battles between the
Mormons and the federal government. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Suppose one believed
that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously
contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a
sacrifice?"); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890) ("And histoiy discloses the fact that the
necessity of human sacrifices, on special occasions, has been a tenet of many sects. Should
[such] a sect. ... ever find its way into this country, swift punishment would follow the carrying
into effect of its doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretence [sic] that, as religious
beliefs, their supporters could be protected in their exercise by the constitution of the United
States.").
56. Cf Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation ofReligion: An Update anda Response
to the Critics, 60 GEORGE WASH. L. REv. 685, 734 (1992) ("Of course, truly mainstream
religions have little need for accommodations at all. Given their influence on the culture, it is
unlikely that the laws will conflict in any serious way with their deeply held principles.").
57. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 89-90.
58. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 1147-49.
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political process."59 This criterion, McConnell hoped, would lead to more
protective results in cases like Goldman v. Weinberger,60 United v. Lee ,6 and
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assn ', 6 as McConnell believed
such burdens would never be imposed on mainstream religions like
Christianity. 6 1
Yet, McConnell struggled to find any exemption that his test would
plausibly deny. He tried to come up with such a claim from the conscription
cases, arguing that, for example, "A country could probably not survive if it
allowed selective conscientious objection to war."64 But this argument does not
seem to work. A country with mainstream religious groups that oppose war can
do many things. Most likely, it will avoid going to war altogether; a country of
pacifists probably just becomes a pacifist country. But there are other options
too. A nation like that could simply never have a draft, which completely
avoids the problem of having to conscript objecting pacifists. Or a nation could
insist on a draft, but still exempt mainstream faiths. Yet a common thread runs
through all of this-the least imaginable alternative is that a serious mainstream
group finds itself drafted into a war against its will. All this is to say that
finding an exemption that this counterfactual. clearly denies seems a quite
difficult task.
There are differences between the way that McConnell on the one hand,
and Eisgruber and Sager on the other, would have courts apply what is
basically the same counterfactual. The most noticeable is the standard of proof.
McConnell would resolve close cases in favor of the religious claimant. 65
Eisgruber and Sager would resolve close cases in favor of the government .6
With a completely determinate standard, there would be no difference in
application. But there is-there is, in fact, a large difference. McConnell
believed that the counterfactual would overrule cases like Goldman v.
Weinberger and United v. Lee. 6 7 But Eisgruber and Sager believe that those
59. Id. at 1147.
60. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding an Air Force regulation that forbade Orthodox Jews
from wearing yarmulkes while on duty and in uniform).
61. 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (refuising to give the Amish an exemption from having to pay
social security and unemployment insurance taxes).
62. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (allowing the government to develop its land over the religious
objections of various Native Americans).
63. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 1148.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1148 ("A government interest is sufficient if it is so important that it is not
conceivable that the government would waive it even if the religious needs of the majority so
required.") (emphasis added).
66. See Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1285 ("In
either a special exemption or a flat rule case, the equal regard exemption claimant must
demonstrate. ... that had her deep, religiously inspired concerns been treated with the same
regard as that enjoyed by the fundamental concerns of citizens generally, she would have been
exempted from the reach of the general law.") (footnote omitted).
67. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 1148 (concluding that Goldman v. Weinberger and
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cases were properly lost, as they were "not so extreme as to offer the possibility
of a confident counterfactual speculation." 68 This disagreement, of course, does
not speak ill of McConnell, Sager, or Eisgruber. But it does speak ill of their
counterfactual. The fact that these fine scholars would apply virtually the same
standard in two vastly different ways ends up backhandedly illustrating the
indeterminacy of their shared standard. Applied in the most straightforward
fashion, the counterfactual seems to give exemptions in every case, although its
very opacity leaves room for interpreters to back off of its radical implications.
But that fall-back option too involves unconstrained discretion; nothing in the
counterfactual gives any guidance as to when its radical implications should be
ignored.
Now there may be a way for Equal Liberty to partially avoid this criticism.
Equal Liberty usually phrases its counterfactual as looking to whether the
government would ever impose similar burdens on mainstream secular or
religious groups .69 But, at one point at least, Eisgruber and Sager seem to dilute
this standard by suggesting that their question is really whether the government
would impose such a burden on a mainstream group of the same size as thle
minority group.70 The relevant passage comes in Equal LiberW, s discussion of
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, a case where a
group of Native Americans sued to stop the government from developing land
that the government owned but that was of religious importance to them. In
evaluating Lyng under the counterfactual, Eisgruber and Sager ask whether the
government would have imposed such burdens on a "small but well-
acknowledged group of Catholics or Orthodox Jews."72
The word "small" almost jumps off the page, and it changes the meaning of
the entire counterfactual and of Equal Liberty as a whole. Up to this point, it
seemed Eisgruber and Sager were proposing a theory of religious liberty that
would fully equalize the playing field for religious minorities. Any burden that
would not be imposed on majority groups could not be imposed on minority
ones. But the addition of the word "small" suggests that religious minorities are
only entitled to the amount of regard appropriate for their numbers. Small
religious groups have the right to be treated like other small groups, but not the
United v. Lee would be decided differently under the counterfactual).
68. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1303-04
(referring to Goldman and Lee).
69. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 90 (looking to whether a legislature would
accommodate "serious mainstream religious or secular interests"); see also Eisgruber & Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1289 (looking to whether "strong secular
needs . .. or mainstream religious needs" would be accommodated); Eisgruber & Sager,
Unthinking Religious Freedom, supra note 2, at 603 (looking to whether "mainstreamn religious
believers and the deep secular concerns of other members of the particular community" would
be accommodated).
70. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 92.
71. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
72. EISGRTJBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 92.
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right to be treated like larger ones. This version of Equal Liberty is one that
essentially controls for size. 3
It is unclear whether Eisgruber and Sager intended this as a true
modification of their theory. It could be deliberate. The way they apply their
counterfactual to the facts of Lyng here differs greatly from the way they
applied it in their earlier work. In 1994, for example, they simply asked whether
the government "would have inflicted a comparable harm on, say, a more
familiar Christian sect[.1,,74 This suggests an intentional narrowing of Equal
Liberty's scope.
Yet, it seems more likely that this change is inadvertent and that Equal
Liberty does not control for size in this way. Eisgruber and Sager's current
book gives many examples of the application of Equal Liberty. None of the
others control for size. Consider, for example, Equal Liberty's extended
discussion of the Smith case .75 Eisgruber and Sager rely on the communion
analogy as a basis for a possible peyote exemption. i6Their application of Equal
Liberty in this context clearly does not control for size-there are far more
Christians using wine than Native Americans using peyote. Eisgruber and
Sager are open to a special regulation of peyote if it was shown to be more
dangerous than alcohol,7 but there is no suggestion that the difference in
numbers alone might justify a basis for treating religious peyote different from
communion wine. 1
73. 1 also have a hard time understanding why Eisgruber and Sager use Catholics and
Orthodox Jews as examples of mainstream religions that are frequently accommodated.
Orthodox Jews have been on the receiving end of some apparent violations of Equal Liberty.
See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding a statutoryregime where stores
are closed on the Christian Sabbath but not on the Jewish Sabbath, thus putting a significant
economic burden on Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(upholding an Air Force regulation that forbade Orthodox Jews from wearing yarmulke while on
duty and in uniform). And Catholics too seem a strange choice, given that they endured much as
a minority religion for the better part of this country's history. See generally PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 191-478 (Harvard University Press, 2002)
(documenting the prevalence and power of anti-Catholicism in church-state relations). The use
of these groups may reflect some implicit desire to back away from the strength of Equal
Liberty's counterfactual.
74. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1303 (stating
that "[t]he facts of Lyng, however, are genuinely extreme" and asking "whether it was
imaginable that the [government] would have inflicted a comparable harm on, say, a more
familiar Christian sect"). Michael McConnell wrote about Lyng in similar terms, "Who can
doubt that the United States Forest Service would find a way to avoid despoiling Christian
worship sites when building logging roads?" McConnell, supra note 10, at 1148.
75. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 92-93, 95-96.
76. Id
77. Id at 93 ("Perhaps peyote is more dangerous than alcohol, so that an exemption for
peyote rituals would be substantially more damaging to state interests than an exemption for
Christian communion ceremonies.").
78. Eisgruber and Sager in fact forcefully criticize the Smith Court's suggestion that it was
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The same conclusion follows from their discussion of another case,
Sherbert v. Verner.7 9 Sherbert is a core case for Equal Liberty; Eisgruber and
Sager frequently return to it as a prime example of what Equal Liberty
requires.80 Sherbert involved a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for not
working on Saturday, her Sabbath. South Carolina prohibited workers from
being fired for taking off Sundays, but offered no protection to people whose
Sabbath was Saturday.8 Eisgruber and Sager consistently treat Sherbert as a
simple case of outright discrimination in favor of Sunday observers and against
Saturday observers, calling it "a classic instance of a failure of equal regard" 83
and "a paradigm of the failure of equal regard."84 Of course, if Equal Liberty
controls for size, then Sherbert should have been a clear victory for South
Carolina. After all, it is a simple fact that there are far more Sunday observers
than Saturday observers. Thus, if the Sabbatarians are only entitled to the
regard of an equivalently small mainstream group, it makes perfect sense that
South Carolina would still choose to only accommodate Sunday observers-for
the simple reason that there are far more of them demanding accommodation.
Clearly Eisgruber and Sager did not intend for South Carolina to be able to
defend their action like this, and so it seems doubtful that Equal Liberty's
counterfactual controls for size in this way.
But ultimately, regardless of whether Equal Liberty controls for size, it
faces serious issues. If Equal Liberty does not control for size, its circularity
seems to ensure that no exemption will ever be denied. If Equal Liberty does
control for size, it means that the most attractive components of the theory
simply disappear. The purpose of the counterfactual inquiry is to defend against
the "substantial risk that governmental actors, even while bearing no animus
toward minority religious believers, will ignore, undervalue, or implicitly
denigrate their deep, religiously motivated concerns."8 But if Equal Liberty
in the very nature of the democratic process to leave small groups at a disadvantage. Eisgruber
and Sager's criticism would be hard to understand if Equal Liberty controlled for size, because
it would open Equal Liberty up to the same precise critique. Compare Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government[.]"), with
EiSGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 95 ("Critics correctly pointed out that this passage seems
to renounce the Court's traditional role as protector of minority rights against majority
oppression. The disadvantaging of minority religions is not unavoidable if courts are doing their
job.") (citations and quotations omitted).
79. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
80. See ELSORUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 40-41 (discussing Sherbert); Eisgruber &
Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, supra note 2, at 601-02 (discussing Sherbert); Eisgruber
& Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1278-89 (discussing Sherbert).
81. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
82. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 40.
83. Eisgruber & Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, supra note 2, at 601.
84. Id. at 602.
85. Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1298.
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only gives small religious groups the regard given to other equivalently small
groups, then it provides fairly little protection at all against that risk.
Ill. EQUAL LIBERTY, RFRA, AND THE COMPELLING-INTEREST TEST
A. Equal Liberty Reconsidered
Of course, Eisgruber and Sager certainly understand that there are
difficulties in applying their counterfactual inquiry. They fully acknowledge
that as we move into "cases in which only our counterfactual judgment is
available ... the job ofjudges will get progressively more difficult. Ultimately,
there will surely be some cases which involve a genuine failure of equal regard
but which evade judicial detection and invalidation."8
What will happen to Equal Liberty then, when it comes to judges to enforce
its mandates? It seems to break down into general applicability. Equal Liberty
vigilantly opposes laws that are not generally applicable; such laws clearly
violate Equal Liberty's principles. 87 Beyond that, however, Equal Liberty has to
rely chiefly on the counterfactual inquiry which courts will have to ignore
because of its workability problems.
Yet, maybe this criticism of Equal Liberty is not a criticism at all. Perhaps
this is the beauty of Equal Liberty: it is the perfect translation of the equality
norm into the context of religious exemptions.8 Were it workable, Equal
Liberty would be the precise tailoring of a nondiscrimination right into the
context of religious exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause. But, alas, it is not
workable. Thus, in practice, courts must satisfy' themselves with general
applicability. Equal Liberty is the true constitutional requirement, but courts
will have to go with the less protective but workable rule of Smith for reasons
of practicality. Free Exercise, to put it another way, should go judicially
underenforced. Those familiar with Professor Sager's other work will not be
surprised. In light of his longstanding interest and thoughtful work in the area
of judicial underenforcement, the fact that Equal Liberty would be such an
underenforced norm makes sense. 89
But if Equal Liberty boils down (in terms ofjudicial. application) to general
applicability, what virtues does it have as a distinct theory? A cynic might say
there simply are not any. And there is some truth to that. Losing plaintiffs will
86. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 120; Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability
of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1302 ("Somewhere along the line, the capacity of the judiciary
to police equal regard will run out.").
87. EiSGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 90 ("Failures of equal regard are especially easy
to recognize when the state has accommodated serious mainstream religious or secular interests
but refuses to provide an equivalent accommodation for the comparably serious interests of
minority religious groups or individuals.").
88. Id at 119 ("We hope that we have shown that [Equal Liberty is] an equality-based
approach [that] can provide a robust basis for accommodating religious conduct.").
89. See Sager, supra note 5.
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not distinguish between courts that determine the Constitution was not violated
and courts that determine that the Constitution may have been violated, but any
violation is beyond the capacity of the judiciary to recognize. That distinction
matters to constitutional theorists, but it will not matter to losing plaintiffs.
Yet there are indeed some important remaining virtues in Equal Liberty's
approach. First, Equal Liberty applies not only to judges but to all government
officials, at all levels and branches of government.9 0 Bound by the Constitution,
legislative and executive officials in state and federal government should give
equal regard to religious minorities and voluntarily refrain from passing or
enforcing laws that fail that standard-even when such laws are both neutral
and generally applicable. 9 ' Second, Equal Liberty suggests a justification for
congressional intervention under the enforcement power. 92 While the judiciary
will only enforce part of Equal Liberty (the general applicability part), Congress
is empowered to enforce the principles of Equal Liberty to the full limits of its
logic. This naturally suggests a rationale for the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA") 93 or something like it, an issue which we will consider in a
moment. And third and finally, Equal Liberty may better explain Smith itself-
and, in particular, the persistence of certain exceptions to Smith. Take, for
example, the ministerial exception (or other church-autonomy cases). Courts
have continued to grant religious exemptions in these cases, even after Smith
and even though doing so seems somewhat inconsistent with Smith's
language.9 But if we think of Smith as the prudential underenforcement of
constitutional principle, it would be entirely natural to expect courts to ignore it
in situations where its prudential logic does not apply-such as in cases of
internal church governance, where the dispute is narrow and involves on,
private parties, and where Smith's fears of "courting anarchy" do not exist.V
90. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 246-52 (explaining how Equal Liberty
constrains Congress as well as state and local legislative bodies).
9 1. See Sager, supra note 5, at 1227 ("The most direct consequence of adopting this
revised view is the perception that government officials have a legal obligation to obey an
underenforced constitutional norm which extends beyond its interpretation by the federal
judiciary to the fuill dimensions of the concept which the norm embodies."); see also Berman,
supra note 4, at 87 (emphasizing this point).
92. See EISGRIJBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 255 ("[Ilf some rights are judicially
underenforced, then Congress may legitimately use the Constitution's 'enforcement provisions'
to go beyond the scope ofjudicially enforced rights. More precisely, Congress would have the
authority and the responsibility to enforce the full measure of constitutional rights that the
judiciry... [left] underenforced.").
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
94. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CiN. L. REV. 151, 218-19 (2003) ("[T]he Constitution still guarantees some
special freedoms for religious institutions even after Employment Division v. Smith, including
the right to hire and fire clergy and the broader right of church autonomy[.]").
95. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("Any society adopting
such a [compelling interest test] system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in
direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
9
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B. Equal Liberty and RFRA
This brings us to an important issue. Others too have conceived of Smith as
deliberately underenforcing the relevant constitutional norm.9 But those people
often take a substantive view toward religious exemptions. One important
aspect of Eisgruber and Sager's work is that they effectively demonstrate that-
even if one has an entirely equality-based view of Free Exercise-Smith is still
an underenforcing decision. 97 They convincingly demonstrate a quite
substantial gap between general applicability and the truer conception of
equality that Equal Liberty embodies. 98 And, of course, the larger the gap
between the Smith rule and true equality, the more it suggests that Congress
should act to fill that gap and the more it suggests that Congress should get
some deference in filling the gap the way it thinks best. In this way, Eisgruber
and Sager's work pushes toward a conclusion that they themselves do not
believe: namely, the propriety (and constitutionality) of the compellipg interest
test created by statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.9
Eisgruber and Sager denounce the compelling-interest test with forceful
language. 100 But they must see some positive aspects to it. After all, the test
allows courts to reach results that Eisgruber and Sager think are right in
situations where the Smith rule would not and where Eq~ual Liberty might not.
Smith itself seems to be one example; Lyng is another.1' Along this same line,
Eisgruber and Sager support the result in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 102 so far the only Supreme Court case
suppress none of them.").
96. This was a theme in Professor Lupu's work right after Smith. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1993) [hereinafter Lupu,
Statutes Revolving] ("Under this view, Smith is a political question case, holding that judicially
manageable standards for the resolution of Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking."); Ira C.
Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 759-60 (1992) ("Smith
may be seen as pronouncing an entirely institutional rather than substantive judgment, to which
text and history would be more relevant, about the force of the Free Exercise Clause."); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Comment. Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 11 I ILutv. L. REv. 153, 190 (1997) ("The real logic of the Smith decision has
to do with institutional roles. ... In other words, the Smith Court consciously decided to give
less than full protection to free exercise in order to protect legislative prerogative.").
97. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 93-100 (discussing criticism of the Smith
case and suggesting a more "robust" equality principle).
98. See infra notes 27-45 and accompany text.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1988 & Supp. V 1994). This same point would also hold true for
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000), as well as
state versions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, known as state RFRAs.
100. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 119 (describing the compelling interest test
as "flagrantly and indefensibly partial to religion and destructive of important state interests").
101. Id at 253 (noting regretfully that courts "may have a hard time identify'ing failures of
equal regard in cases like the Peyote Case [Smith] and Lyng").
102. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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interpreting RFRA. 103 They also support the result in Cutter v. Wilkinson,' 0 so
far the only Supreme Court case interpreting the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLULPA"). 105 Eisgruber and Sager applaud the
results of these cases, but those results happened because of the compelling-
interest test, which they reject.
Yet at the same time, of course, Eisgruber and Sager see RFRA as deeply
problematic because they believe it gives far too much power to religious
claimants to avoid their legal obligations.10 6 Eisgruber and Sager frequentl~
phrase it as giving religious people a presumptive right to disobey the law.A
Behind that also stands their concern that RFRA gives religious people undue
preference over their nonreligious counterparts.10
This is the interesting paradox. For Eisgruber and Sager, both Smith and
RFRA are deficient. Smith underenforces the constitutional norm rightly
understood, while RFRA overenforces it. Other people may also believe this;
perhaps many people find themselves somewhere between Smith and RFRA.' 09
But given that there is so much agreement on the level of results, why is
there so much disagreement on the level of doctrine? If there are many people
between Smith and RFRA, why do some (lie Eisgruber and Sager) prefer
Smith to RFRA, while others prefer RFRA to Smith? Some of it, no doubt, is
honest disagreement over the contours of the constitutional right (and in
particular about whether it is a substantive or nondiscrimination right). But
there are at least three other things that may explain it as well.
First, part of the disagreement may lie in differing ideas about where to
place the risk of error. There are two types of error here-the improperly
granted exemption and the improperly denied exemption. The disagreement
here might be over the relative costs of these two types of mistake. Those who
embrace RFRA seem more willing to tolerate the costs associated with
improperly granted exemptions. An erroneously granted exemption, they say,
could well be harmless, assuming it does not unduly affect the rights of third
parties or important government interests. And to the extent that RFRA does
103. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 265-67.
104. 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (unanimously upholding the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act against an Establishment Clause challenge).
105. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 247-48.
106. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Wh'7y the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 437, 450-51 (1994); Lawrence G.
Sager, Congress as Partner/Congress as Adversary, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 88 (1998).
107. EiSGRTJBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 82 (calling it an "entitle[ment] to disregard laws
that get in the way of their religious convictions[.]"); id. (referring to a "get-out-of-jail-free
privilege"); id. at 262 ("give[s] religiously motivated persons a presumptive right to disobey
laws that [get] in their way").
108. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 11-13, 54-55 (discussing the soup kitchen
hypothetical).
109. For a recent example, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels:
Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1189 (2008).
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result in improperly granted exemptions, Congress always retains the power to
undo such exemptions through prospective legislation.
On the other hand, those who back away from RFRA view the risks of
error differently, in a way that counsels for underenforcement rather than
overenforcement. This is where Eisgruber and Sager's concern about
nonreligious people plays an important role. If one views the granting of any
unnecessary religious exemptions as intrinsically unfair to nonreligious people,
one will be less willing to tolerate improperly granted exemptions. In fact, one
might not be willing to tolerate any improperly granted exemptions. Though
this is not perfectly clear, Eisgruber and Sager's view seems to be that any
improperly granted exemption-that is, any exemption that is given in the
absence of a violation of equal regard-violates the Establishment Clause. This
view allocates all the risk of error to one side. It pushes courts into denying
exemptions when there is any doubt as to whether Equal Liberty has been
violated. It paralyzes Congress, which could never craft a statute that could
precisely match the requirements of Equal Liberty. This view naturally and
inevitably results in serious underenforcement of Free Exercise, even as
Eisgruber and Sager define it. And, in a way, this makes a good deal of sense,
given Eisgruber and Sager's fundamental concern for the equality of
nonreligious people. When the line is murky and one fears going over as much
as Eisgruber and Sager do, it is entirely natural to come up far short of that line.
But the downside to this approach is that we must tolerate an exceptionally high
degree of underenforcement.
Second, part of the disagreement over doctrine may also lie in different
conceptions about the proportions of these cases. If we fear improperly granted
exemptions and improperly denied exemptions equally, the issue simply
becomes which rule will produce more errors. Eisgruber and Sager rely on the
soup kitchen example as the quintessential example of how religious
exemptions are unfair to nonreligious people.' 10 This is the sort of error that
things like RERA produce, they would say. But if one sees such cases as
hypotheticals that do not arise often in the real world, one will have less fear of
RFRA. And those who regularly see the devastating effects of improperly
denied exemptions will think that RFRA will reduce, rather than increase, the
total number of errors.
This ties in to another important point. Even more problematic, I think, for
Eisgruber and Sager's theory is the possibility of as-applied challenges to
RERA. After all, to the extent that RFRA gives out exemptions inappropriately,
courts already have the necessary tools to prune RFRA back. With as-applied
challenges, courts can invalidate certain religious exemptions that RFRA might
give as violating the Establishment Clause."' This provides a natural and
110. See supra notes 24-26 & accompanying text.
Ill1. Given that Eisgruber and Sager recognize that RFRA can have at least some valid
applications, this would be the approach the Supreme Court apparently would take. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (explaining that a party bringing a facial challenge
must "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid").
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valuable shield against overenforcement. But there is no corresponding shield
against underenforcement-because in the absence of RERA, courts have no
comparable power to start granting such exemptions. Thus, invalidating RERA
on its face seems like gratuitous overkill-a serious cost with no benefit.
Throwing out the baby with the bathwater is unjustified when the two can be
easily separated.
Our third and final point about doctrine is that our disagreement over the
merits of the compelling-interest test may also trace back to different
understandings about what it means. Eisgruber and Sager fear the sort of
compelling-interest test that is "strict in theory and fatal in fact,"" 2 which might
lead to "wildly impractical" results.' '3 They fear a compelling-interest test that
would create a "ruthless presumption of invalidity" for every federal law.' 14 But
as Eisgruber and Sager recognize, this was not the case before Smith."15 So it
hardly seems like it would be the case under RFRA's restoration of the pre-
Smith standard. Indeed, RFRA now seems to provide exactly what Eisgruber
and Sager were looking for in Equal Liberty-that is, RFRA now acts as an
amped-up version of general applicability. Consider, for example, Gonzales v.
0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unidc do Vegetal,"16 the Supreme Court's recent
RFRA case. The Court concluded unanimously that the government had no
compelling interest in its ban on the importation of hoasca. But it did so largely
because of an existing exception in the drug laws for the religious use of
peyote. RFRA simply gave the Court license to adopt the very sort of enhanced
general applicability protection that Eisgruber and Sager designed Equal
Liberty to provide.
Some object to this. They claim that the Court should not adopt a
compelling interest test for the Free Exercise Clause that is watered down. The
test should not mean one thing with respect to one constitutional clause and
another thing with respect to another. It risks judicial confusion and might lead
to a watering down of the compelling interest test across the board, in other
important doctrinal areas." 7 But I do not share this fear. In law, words and
There is debate as to whether Salerno should apply to Establishment Clause cases. See Marc E.
Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the ValidRule Requirement, 48 Am~.
U. L. R~v. 359, 401-02 (1998).
112. Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (quotations omitted).
113. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 40-41 (quoting Gunther).
114. See Eisgruber & Sager, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 2, at 447.
115. See Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at 1247
(claiming that the compelling interest test, under the pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause, had been
".strict in theory, but feeble in fact") (emphasis added).
116. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 1465, 1499-1500 (1999) ("So long as 'strict scrutiny' is used to describe the
'strict in theory, pretty much fatal in fact' scrutiny applicable to content-based speech
restrictions and to racial and religious classifications, it shouldn't be used to describe the
necessarily weaker test applicable to religious exemption clais... Using the same term to
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phrases frequently have different meanings in different circumstances."' The
Court understands, and indeed now reminds us, that "[c]ontext matters in
applying the compelling interest test[.]"19 What a compelling interest is
depends on the facts of the case as well as the constitutional clause and right at
issue. The government has an interest in protecting children, for example, but
the Court has found the strength of that interest to vary depending on the facts
and right at issue. Thus, protecting children has been a compelling interest in
the context of restricting the Free Speech rights of minors to view
pornography.12 0 It has sometimes been a compelling interest in the context of
restricting the Confrontation Clause rights of criminal defendants.'12 ' But it has
never been a compelling interest in the context of Establishment Clause
restrictions on private speech in the public schools. 122 Considerations of race
have sometimes been compelling for purposes oflustifying affirmative action
plans under the Equal Protection Clause'P bu have never been compelling for
purposes of suppressing private parties' Free Speech rights.124
describe different tests poses [] practical problems."); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("Moreover, if 'compelling interest' really means what it says (and
watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws
will not meet the test.").
118. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 n.8 (2004)
("The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in
connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all
of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against."); see also Cherokee Nation v. State of Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 19
(183 1) ("It has been also said, that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning
attached to them when found in different parts of the same instrument: their meaning is
controlled by the context. This is undoubtedly true.").
119. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003))
(alteration in original).
120. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a New York statute that
prohibited selling indecent magazines to minors under the age of 17, even though those
magazines would not have been obscene and thus proscribed for adults).
121. Compare Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that it violated the
Confrontation Clause to place a screen between a criminal defendant and the child sexual
assault victim testifying against him), with Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding
that it did not violate the Confrontation Clause for a child witness to testify against a criminal
defendant through one-way closed circuit television).
122. See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a
Christian club had a Free Speech right to meet on public school property after the school day,
and that the Establishment Clause concerns raised by the school district did not amount to a
compelling interest that could trump those Free Speech rights). The principles in Good News
were built up over a number of cases. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
123. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[T~he Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
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In fact, just consider the state of affairs with the compelling interest test
today-just in the domain of the Free Exercise Clause. The Smith/Lukumi rule
evaluates facially discriminatory laws under a compelling interest test. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act evaluates all federal laws that substantially
burden religious exercise under a compelling interest test. But those two
compelling interest tests are not at all the same. Under Smith/Lukumi, facially
discriminatory laws face a compelling-interest test that "is not 'watered down'
but 'really means what it says."' 125 Such laws "will survive strict scrutiny only
in rare cases." 126 But RFRA's compelling interest test seems quite different.
Gonzales interpreted it to require "'.sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests."", 27 Gonzales used the phrase
"sensible balances" three times, 18and ocue the case with it.' 29 So while
Smith/Lukumi and Gonzales both create compelling-interest tests, those two
compelling-interest tests differ radically from each other. And courts
understand this perfectly well. Consider a decision last year from the Arizona
Supreme Court, which rightly distinguished between the lighter "compelling
interest test" of Gonzales and the more stringent "modified compelling interest
test" of Smith/Lukuni. 130 So Eisgruber and Sager are surely right that "[t]he
compelling interest test cannot bear the meaning in the area of religious
exemptions that it has elsewhere" in the sense that we surely could not tolerate
a "ruthless presumption of invalidity" of all government laws.'13 ' But even the
most fervent supporters of RFRA reject that sort of presumption, and there is
simply no risk that courts would ever adopt it. When we turn from theory into
practice, we do not have to worry about overenforcing Free Exercise. The only
real risk is the other way; the only real risk is underenforcement.
This is not to say that the compelling interest test is the only doctrinal
vehicle that can reach the proper results in these cases. There are certainly other
further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.").
124. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) ("The dispositive
question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to
achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is not.").
125. See Church of the Lukumni Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) (quoting Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
126. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
127. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 439 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2), (5)).
128. Id. at 436, 439.
129. Id. at 439 ("But Congress has determined that courts should strike sensible balances,
pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Government to address the particular
practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude that the courts below did not err in
determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a
compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca. The judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
130. See State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1008-09 (Ariz. 2009).
131. See Eisgruber & Sager, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 2, at 447.
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alternatives.132 What is most important, I think, is that the government be forced
to offer some justification for the rule in question whose validity the court can
evaluate and that the plaintiff can dispute. A large part of the compelling
interest test is how it operates as an evidentiary device. At the beginning of the
case, the purposes of a law and the interests it serves are known principally by
the govemnment, leaving little for any plaintiff to do. She can show how the law
burdens her. She can look to the statutes or to past history to see what
exceptions have been made in the past. But she has difficulty showing that a
law is borne of "discrimination, hostility, or neglect"' 3 3 --even when that law is
actually borne of discrimination, hostility, or neglect. The compelling-interest
test forces the government to defend some rationale and to bear the costs when
it cannot be supported by logic or evidence. That gives the litigation a reference
point; it gives the plaintiff something to attack. Just as the compelling-interest
can be used to "flush out" unconstitutional motives, it can also ferret out the
sort of insubstantial governmental interests that should be unconstitutional
under either an Equal Liberty or substantive neutrality rubric.' 34
IV. SEEGER AND WELSH: A CONVERGENCE OF THEORIES
This review can end on an upbeat note, which is that I share Eisgruber and
Sager's assessment that the gap between equal liberty theorists and proponents
of substantive neutrality is far less than most would imagine. This point can be
shown by considering in more detail two cases that are at the heart of Eisgruber
and Sager's theory. These are the conscientious objector cases that arose with
regard to the military draft-Welsh v. United States 135 and United States v.
Seeger. 136
In both cases, the Court was dealing with the conscientious objector statute.
In order to get an exemption from military service, a dissenting individual was
required to sign a statement in the Selective Service form stating, "I am, by
reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form."' 17 According to the statute, "religious training
132. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall. The Case
for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 925. 937-38 (1998) (advocating for the
adoption of a "flexible standard of intermediate judicial scrutiny," and arguing that this standard
"would strike an appropriate balance between the government's interest in the uniform
adherence to laws of general applicability and the interest of individuals in receiving modest
accommodation for the free exercise of religious beliefs").
133. EiSGRUBER& SAGER, supra note 2, at 112.
134. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUsT: A THEORY OF JuDiciAL REviEw 146
(Harvard University Press 1980) ("[Flunctionally, [a] special scrutiny [standard], in particular
its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out' unconstitutional
motivation[.]").
135. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
136. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
137. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336-37 (describing the form that both Welsh and Seeger had to fill
out).
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and belief' included "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being,"
but did not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a personal moral code."' 3 8 Seeger and Welsh were both pacifists who refused to
sign the statement as written.' 13 Ultimately, the Court stretched the statute to
include both of them, although their objections seemed perhaps more moral
than religious. Eisgruber and Sager praise the Court's conclusion and see it as
tacit support for Equal Liberty's founding premise-the premise that
nonreligious people like Seeger and Welsh should not be devalued simply
because their fundamental beliefs are not religious.140 Others too have seen
Seeger and Welsh as support for Eisgruber and Sager's theory.'14'
But while I too support the results in Seeger and Welsh, I see these cases as
grounded as much in substantive neutrality as in equal liberty. Substantive
neutrality, remember, is concerned with two things.142 The first is the unfairness
to the plaintiff if the exemption is denied. So take again the Smith case.'14 3
Denying the Native American Church the right to use peyote means that its
adherents come under pressure. They will either be exposed to civil fines and
criminal sentences, have to change their religious rituals, or give up on their
religion altogether. But substantive neutrality is also concerned with the
unfairness to people other than the plaintiff if the exemption is granted. To the
extent that letting the Native American Church use peyote incentivizes others to
join the Church, we have a reason to deny the exemption or extend it to deep
rooted claims of secular conscience.
In many exemption cases, the second force is small compared to the first.
Peyote is crucial to Native American worship, but it is not crucial to much else.
Cold Kosher meals mean much to Orthodox Jewish prisoners, but most
prisoners would prefer something hot to eat.'44 Thus, where religious and
secular observers will likely want the same thing with the same intensity, the
138. This was the form of the statute at the time of Seeger. See United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 165 (1965). By the time of Welsh, the reference to a "Supreme Being" had been
deleted, but the part about political, sociological, philosophical or personal moral views (and
how they did not count) remained. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336 & n.2.
139. See, e.g., Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336-37.
140. EISGRUnER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 114 ("If the government granted conscientious-
objector status only on the basis of religiously motivated opposition to war, it would be favoring
some needs over others purely on the basis of their theological character or spiritual
foundation."); see also Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 2, at
1294-96 (discussing Seeger and Welsh).
141. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 582 ("The closest the Supreme Court has come to
adopting an equal regard standard was a pair of draft exemption cases during the Vietnam
War."); McConnell, supra note 3, at 6 ("The only cases which [support Eisgruber and Sager's
thesis] were two Vietnam-era draft cases.").
142. What follows owes much to Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 993 (1990).
143. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
144. Cf Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 71J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 313,
350 (1996) ("Most religious behavior is meaningless or burdensome to nonbelievers.").
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thing should be given equally to both. This is probably the best way of
explaining why religious groups cannot get preferential treatment in the form of
religion-only exemptions when it comes to speech or money.14 5 But where
religious groups want unique things, or want them with unique intensity,
religious exemptions do not suggest favoritism. Scholars sometimes analogize
religious exemptions to affrmative action.14 6 But this analogy holds only when
what is at stake is something everyone wants. Almost everyone feels a strong
desire to go to college.'147 But almost no one feels a strong desire to have a
driver's license without their picture on it.'148
Let us now turn back to Seeger and Welsh. One can see the problem in
Seeger and Welsh as being that religious objectors were given an exemption
that secular objectors were denied. But this may phrase the problem at too high
a level of generality, for Seeger and Welsh also involve intense religious
pressure to convert-a pressure that exists in few cases and not in the standard
"soup kitchen" example that Eisgruber and Sager offer.
To get an exemption from military service, Seeger and Welsh only had to
sign their agreement with the statement that they were, "by reason of my
religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form." 49 If Seeger and Welsh had simply signed the statement and kept
quiet, they would have escaped notice. But both of them refused to do that,
choosing to add some creative amendments of their own to the form: Seeger put
quotation marks around the word "religious"; Welsh crossed it out entirely.150
Where the form asked them whether they believed in a Supreme Being, Seeger
refused to answer, and Welsh checked the "no" box.' 5' These responses led
145. In Mitchell v. Helms, for example, the plurality opinion seemed to think that funding
for religious institutions would cross the constitutional line if only religious institutions were
funded. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000). In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, a
fractured Court struck down a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals as violating the
Establishment Clause, suggesting that when it comes to issues of speech, religious groups
cannot be exempted from burdens that nonreligious ones face. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
146. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirm ative Action, 40 EMORY
L.J. 77 (1991).
147. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action plan
of the University of Michigan Law School under an Equal Protection challenge); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the affirmative action plan of the University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts under an Equal Protection challenge).
148. See Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (involving the claim of a Christian
woman religiously objected to being photographed for her Nebraska driver's license).
149. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1970).
150. Id. at 337 ("Seeger could sign only after striking the words 'training and' and putting
quotation marks around the word 'religious.' Welsh could sign only after striking the words 'my
religious training and."').
151. See Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1968), rev 'd, 398 U.S. 333
(1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). The Court noted that "Welsh was far
more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were religious." Welsh, 398
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them straight into a full-blown examination concerning the details of their
religious beliefs.
Welsh's experience is telling.152 Before the Hearing Officer of the
Department of Justice, Welsh maintained the position he took on the form. The
Department of Justice provided this account of the inquiry:
[Welsh] reiterated that he did not believe in taking a human life but he did not
see it as a moral or religious wrong but simply as a social "error" or illogical
act. The Hearing Officer reported that several times the registrant denied that
any of his thinking had a religious basis. He conceded the possibility that
some of his early religious training may have rubbed off on him but he
stressed that his belief is that his opinions have been formed by reading in the
fields of history and sociology, and that they are purely "rational" as opposed
to religious ... [The Hearing Officer] found that the registrant does not
believe in life after death, does not believe in God or in any other being or
entity outside of man which has any authority over men ... The Hearing
Officer found no religious basis for the registrant's conscientious-objector
claim and concluded that the registrant's claim does not come within the
provisions of the statutory exemption[.]...
But while Welsh rejected the religious label initially, things began to
change after the Hearing Officer denied Welsh conscientious objector status.
Welsh then wrote an eight-page letter to the Appeal Board that can only be
described as backpedaling. Welsh tried to explain that although he had said
earlier that he was not religious, he had really just misunderstood the hearing
officer. Deep down, he really was religious, at least in a certain sense:
I believe I mentioned taking of life as not being, for me, a religious wrong.
Again, I assumed Mr. Bradley was using the term "religious" in a
conventional sense, and in order to be perfectly honest [1] did not characterize
my belief as religious .. . To summarize, I would like to reiterate that, though
my beliefs are not religious in the conventional sense of my deriving the
U.S. at 341.
152. A full chronological account of Welsh's story and the related documents can be found
in the government's brief in Welsh along with the Joint Appendix. See Brief for the United
States at 1-6, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (no. 76), 1969 WL 136925; Joint
Appendix at 10-54, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (on file with the author and
the Tennessee Law Review). Pertinent parts of the material can be found in the Supreme Court's
decision in Welsh, as well as the Ninth Circuit's opinion. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335-38; Welsh,
404 F.2d at 1078-80, 1090-92.
153. Joint Appendix at 22-23, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (report of the
Department of Justice) (on file with the author and the Tennessee Law Review). This passage is
discussed and cited in part in Welsh, 404 F.2d at 1090 (Hamnley, J., dissenting); see also Welsh,
398 U.S. at 341 (noting that "Welsh ... characterized his beliefs as having been formed 'by
reading in the fields of history and sociology"').
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authority for such beliefs from a belief in God, they are certainly religious in
the ethical sense of the word[J 154
Welsh's letter also backed away from his earlier statements about having
wholly secular ethical beliefs:
This concern[, each person's concern for all of humanity], it seems to me, is
implicit in all religious belief, even the most primitive, where, though its
expression seems sometimes to be bizarre, it still acts to govern people's
relationships, one to another.
This, I suppose, is the crux of my problem of explaining my beliefs in
religious terms. Perhaps I erred in taking such pains to point out that I [do]
not believe in the 'standard notion' of God. I think my beliefs could be
considered religious, in the sense I have just explained. I do not call myself
religious, simply because most people then assume that I believe in God, in
the conventional sense."' 55
Thus, notwithstanding what he said before, Welsh asked the Court to
reconsider his claims as religious. He even asked to retract his original claim
that he did not believe in a Supreme Being.156
Others had similar stories. Instructive is the case of Arno Sascha
Jakobson.15 1 Jakobson both wrote on the form and told the hearing officer that
he believed in a Supreme Being.158 But when he explained what this belief
154. Joint Appendix at 44-45, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Letter of
Elliott Welsh to the Appeal Board, dated Oct. 13, 1965) (on file with the author and the
Tennessee Law Review). The Supreme Court quotes parts of this letter at Welsh, 398 U.S. at
341-42.
155. Joint Appendix at 41-42, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Letter of
Elliott Welsh to the Appeal Board, dated Oct. 13, 1965) (on file with the author and the
Tennessee Law Review). The dissent in the Ninth Circuit quotes part of this letter at Welsh, 404
F.2d at 1091 (Hamley, J., dissenting).
156. This had happened in an earlier letter sent before the meeting with the Hearing
Officer. See Joint Appendix at 29, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Letter of Elliott
Welsh to the Local Board, dated June 22, 1965) (on file with the author and the Tennessee Law
Review).
Other parts of this process also seem striking forty years later. For example, the
Hearing Officer's report said that Welsh had attended Sunday School at his parents' church but
had "never gotten anything out of it," which prompted Welsh to respond that he had gotten
something out of it-...I certainly did not mean to imply that the religious training I received
there had nothing to do with the ethical or moral values I live by." Joint Appendix at 38, Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Letter of Elliott Welsh to the Appeal Board, dated Oct.
13, 1965) (on file with the author and the Tennessee Law Review). Having officials from the
Department of Justice interrogate citizens about how much they learned in Sunday School
seems a bit troubling.
157. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963).
158. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965). Jakobson's case was
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meant to him, Jakobson sounded remarkably like Paul Tillich, an influential if
somewhat unorthodox Lutheran minister and theologian.15 9 In some ways,
Jakobson was actually more orthodox than Tillich.'16 Nonetheless, neither
Jakobson nor Tillich was sufficiently orthodox for the hearing officer, who
found that Jakobson was not religious enough to fall within the meaning of the
relevant statutes.'16 ' Jakobson was nearly drafted because his theology
resembled Tillich's, rather than a more mainstream Christian theologian.
These cases are striking in the degree of religious pressure being exerted on
these individuals. Welsh is pushed from being nonreligious to being religious;
Jakobson is pushed from one type of religion to another. And this sort of
religious pressure was par for the course. At the time, numerous draft boards
reported last-minute religious conversions they described as "Damascus
Claims."'163 Some of these claims, no doubt, were false claims of conversion,
calculated to avoid prosecution. That alone is disturbing. But just as disturbin~
is the fact that some of those Damascus claims were apparently sincere. I
Many people have strong opinions about religion. But for those who do not
think much about issues of religious belief, or find themselves conflicted, or
find the evidence in relative equipoise-this sort of influence can be highly
persuasive. Courts during this time blithely assumed that this would never
happen-that applicants would never honestly change their religions for the
draft exemption. 65But we see clearly in retrospect the pressure that is working
here; the only hard question, I think, is whether these cases are more
reminiscent of test oaths or heresy trials.'166
consolidated with Seeger's, and the Seeger decision addresses it.
159. See Jakobson, 325 F.2d at 415.
160. See Jako bson, 325 F.2d at 416 n.6 ("Jakobson comes closer to a traditional reading of
'Supreme Being' than Tillich in one respect, namely, his acceptance of the notion of an original
creator and supreme existence, which Tillich finds unacceptable as subjecting God to categories
of finitude.").
16 1. Cf Seeger, 3 80 U.S. at 168 ("The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon
a personal moral code and that [Jakobson] was not sincere in his claim.").
162. See id. at 187 (granting Jakobson an exemption).
163. T. Oscar Smith & Derrick A. Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program-A Search
for Sincerity, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 695, 698-703 (1958) (explaining such claims). The appellation
is taken from Paul's conversion to Christianity along the road to Damascus. See NEW
TESTAmENT, ACTS 9:3-6.
164. Smith & Bell, supra note 163, at 722 ("As with Paul's conversion, [these last-minute
religious] convictions that they cannot take part in war may be quite sincere[.]").
165. For an example of a reviewing court trying very hard to convince itself that religious
conviction is not the product of choice, and thus that no draft inductee could ever be pressured
into making such a choice, see United States v. Brown, 129 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1955)
(arguing that "[olne does not compel religious conviction," because "the operations of the
human mind are as mysterious as they are unpredictable in the acceptance or non-acceptance of
belief').
166. For an argument for the former, see Francis JI Conlin, S.J., Conscientious Objector
Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963).
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The obvious must also be kept in mind: the stakes here were enormous.
The consequence of Welsh's initial rejection of the label "religious" was that he
was sentenced to a three-year prison term for resisting the draft.167 Reviewing
courts kept saying that the draft board proceedings were not criminal trials, and
thus objectors did not have the same statutory and constitutional rights as
criminal defendants.16 8 But the reason why they kept saying such things was
because that is exactly how they seemed to draftees.
Now there are a couple of ways to justify the exemptions that Welsh and
Seeger ultimately received. The Court reached its result by taking a broad view
of religion and straining to call Welsh's and Seeger's beliefs religious.6 9 While
that approach is certainly not wrong,170 others raise issues with it.'171 One could
prefer, as I do, an alternate explanation: Welsh and Seeger should be exempted
because they are motivated by deep-seated moral reasons that are
indistinguishable in many ways from religious reasons.17 2 But the reason why
the claims in Welsh and Seeger are so keenly felt, I believe, is the enormous
pressure being exerted by government on the free religious choices of its
citizens. I am unsure that the principles behind Welsh and Seeger extend, or
should extend, to the "soup kitchen" example that is at the heart of Equal
Liberty.
CONCLUSION
In Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Professors Christopher
Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have finally laid out in full their vision of
religious liberty and of what the Free Exercise Clause requires in terms of
religious exemptions. All of what they say is thoughtful, most of it unique and
167. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970).
168. See, e.g., Uffelman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1956) ("[A] refuisal
by a Local Board to hear a registrant's proffered witnesses is not a violation of his constitutional
or statutory rights. Proceedings before a Selective Service Board are not atra.)
169. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) ("[T]be test of belief 'in a
relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption."); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339 (same quoted language).
170. Berg, supra note 3, at 1203 ("In my view, the nontheistic conscientious objectors ...
could have been protected on the basis that their objections to killing were connected to their
agnosticism about God and the afterlife.").
171. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips Off Our Block? A Reply to
Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu & Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2007) ("We have always found
this sort of explanation unconvincing and obfuscatory; it has the unattractive quality of insisting
that people's convictions are religious even when those people insist, with great sincerity and
passion, that they are not.").
172. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions ofReligious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793, 1838 (2006)
("Persons with sufficiently deep moral objections to a law are similarly situated with traditional
religious objectors[.]").
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original, and none of it to be missed. It is because we agree on so much that this
essay focuses largely on the details on which we differ. But in the end, I have
no doubt that their theory of religious liberty will influence and challenge us for
many years to come.

